Hysteria? Some basic statements about the constant talk about “the moral image” and the remarkably strained statement “We are not like that”.
In general, the following applies: there are certainly some customs in the “republic as a form of government”. However, these are not completely congruent, inconsistent and often even contradicting one another. In the same way, there were already laws in the “social formation feudalism”. In feudalism, however, the customs (the so-called “traditional”) were clearly more important than the laws. The trick is that the republic is primarily assigned to the “law of the category system” and not to an unspecific network of customs.
In addition, “the morals” are not officially coded in a republic with the small exception of very few court judgments, which, for example, deal with “immoral contracts”, which can never be universally binding because this would then contradict the constitutional idea of freedom. This is a distinguishing feature of the republic from feudalism.
Also typical of republics: A majority vote is used to establish consensus on laws; but not about morals. A “moral image” – … also just an alleged … – is nothing more than a gateway for arbitrariness: anti-republican, anti-democratic, anti-liberal and beyond the standards of the law as well as any rational and binding verifiability (with the exception of official opinion polls regarding the attitudes of citizens to individual customs, but never to a moral ensemble).
Whoever invokes customs often and vehemently in a republic is practicing a kind of “secular religion”. If this is practiced systematically by the head of state, one can justifiably say that he then moves outside the “spirit of the republican constitution” (in the sense of Montesquieu).
The constitutional inspirer Hans Kelsen would also turn away with a shudder. The purpose of Kelsen’s formalism in particular was to bring about precision: … so away from ramblings, away from pure assertions, away from turned, away from gurgles, away from preparing, away from emotional appeals and towards critical-rational verifiability . In the words of the Rousseau criticism: away from the Volonté générale and towards the measurable Volonté de la Majorité.
The danger is that in the end it is only a small step from the defensive, narrow-minded “This is not how we are” to “This is how you have to be”. The annoying talk of “customs” seems to be staged to outside third parties.